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Presentation Overview 
• Requirements and Interpretation Letters 
• Overview of Mechanical Systems Safety 
Interpretation Letter 
• Design and Verification Provisions 
• Mechanical Systems Verification Plan 
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Requirements and 
. Interpretation letters 
• Payload Safety Requirements NHB/NSTS 1700.7B 
• NSTS 14046 Rev. E Payload Verification Requirements 
• Mechanical System Safety Interpretation Letter JSC, 
MA2-00-0S7 (Sept 28, 2000) 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
• Consolidation and clarification of safety requirelnents for the design and 
verification of mechanisms (movable mechanical systems) used in safety 
critical applications 
• Addresses assurance of safety critical functionality for mechanical systems 
- Ability to operate or the ability to retain configuration 
- Not intended to address their strength as a structural element 
- Not intended to address the electrical aspects of an electromechanical system 
• "Safety Critical" refers to a system which has the potential to result in a 
critical or catastrophic hazard if failed 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
Provides clarification on usage of the "design for minimum risk" (DFMR) 
approach as it applies to functionality of a movable mechanical system 
Specifies that compliance with DFMR criteria can normally be used to 
establish safety compliance 
- Designs with only one additional control or backup for a catastrophic hazard 
- Without additional controls for a critical level hazard 
Also permits the use of fully compliant "simple" mechanical systems without 
rnechanicalredundancy 
- DFMR "simple" mechanisms can be considered as having two-failure-tolerance 
equivalency, when specifically approved by the PSRPISRP. 
- A simple mechanical system is defined as a robust mechanism that has relatively 
few lTIoving parts and can demonstrate low sensitivity to environmental and 
operational conditions 
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\ Mechanical System Safety 
\ Interpretation Letter Overview 
• A design can be considered to meet DFMR in functionality if it can be 
demonstrated that credible failure modes have been eliminated 
• Failure modes that must be considered for credibility include, but are not 
limited to binding, jamming, inadvertent operation, failure to function, etc 
• The DFMR approach must include design implementation and verification 
provisions outlined in items 1 through 11 of the interpretation letter, unless its 
clearly not applicable. 
- Alternate approaches to the design, build, and test provisions may be accepted 
based on a clearly substantiated safety equivalency 
• These items will be topics of the payload safety review process for all safety 
critical mechanical systems 
• Mechanical Systems Working Group (MSWG) assesses compliance to safety 
requirements and the interpretation letter 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
1.0 Binding/} amming/Seizing 
• Designs shall include provisions to prevent binding/jamming/seizing 
• Appropriate design provisions include, but are not limited to : 
- Dual rotating surfaces or other mechanical redundancies 
- Robust strength margins such that self-generated internal particles are precluded 
- Shrouding and debris shielding, . 
- Proper selection of materials and lubrication design to prevent friction welding or galling 
• Designs shall also establish dimensional tolerances on all moving parts to ensure 
proper functional performance 
- Must consider all natural and induced environmental conditions 
• thermally induced in-plane and out of plane distortions 
• differential thermal growth and shrinkage 
• load induced deflections 
- Must take into account tolerances associated with rigging (mechanical adjustment) 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
1.0 Binding/Jamming/Seizing (continued) 
• Designs shall ensure compatibility of any lubricants 
- Compatibility with interfacing materials and other lubricants used in the design, 
- COlupatibility with the natural and induced environment. 
- The design shall also address proper quantities of lubricant. 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
2.0 Quick Release Pins 
• Quick release pins (push-in-place (pip)-pins) are considered movable mechanical 
systems 
• A pip-pin design qualified by inspection and test to the provisions of MIL-P-23460, 
or equivalent, shall be used in any system design incorporating pip-pins 
• All flight pip-pins shall be subjected to environmental acceptance testing 
• Pip-pins shall undergo qualification vibration test 
- In place in their respective hardware locations during the qualification test of the total 
assembly 
Or, component test to the predicted qualification levels at the hardware location 
• Pip-pins shall also be subjected to thermal qualification testing to the max/min flight 
temperatures 
• Due to a history of failures with pip-pins, the "simple" mechanical system approach 
is not applicable 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
3.0 Springs 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Safety critical springs shall be redundant or designed, evaluated, and used under an 
acceptable fracture control progralll (ref. NASA-STD-5003) 
Failure of springs that are properly controlled under an acceptable fracture control 
program is considered non-credible 
The design and use of a fail-safe spring or the use of a spring that maintains 
functionality with the loss of a single coil is acceptable 
Compression springs should be used in lieu of tension or torsional springs, where 
practical 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
4.0 Fastener Retention 
• A means of positive locking (i.e. , self-locking threads, self-locking inserts, etc.) shall 
be provided on all fasteners (threaded and otherwise) 
• Assures integrity of the mechanical assemblies and prevents loose parts. 
• Positive locking is in addition to the standard torque/preload of the fastener 
• Locking compounds shall not be used on fasteners to provide locking, where other 
positive locking methods are practicable 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
5.0 Strength and Fracture Control 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Structural design of safety critical mechanical system components shall adhere to 
paragraphs 208.1, 208.2, and 208.3 of NSTS 1700.7 
Movable mechanical assemblies used in safety critical applications shall be included 
in an acceptable fracture control program (ref. NASA-STD-5003) 
Components and linkages shall be designed with sufficient strength to tolerate an 
actuation force/torque stall condition at any point of travel 
A positive margin of safety must be demonstrated with an ultimate factor of safety 
applied 
End of travel mechanical stops shall be designed to have positive strength margins 
for worst case dynamic loading conditions 
- Must consider variables in inertia properties, actuation force/torque, drive train resistance, 
and other environmental conditions 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
5.0 Strength and Fracture Control (continued) 
• Exposed mechanical system components, protective shrouds and covers, and mounting 
structure shall be designed to accommodate inadvertent ilnpact loads 
• RMSISSRMS/pay load operations 
- EV AIlV A loads 
- Must ensure adequate margins to preclude deformation that could cause a binding or 
jamming condition or inadvertent operation of the mechanism 
• A design that incorporates preload as a means of meeting functional andlor structural 
requirements shall comply with the preload criteria defined in NSTS 08307 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
6.0 Positive Indication of Status 
• All movable mechanical systems shall provide positive indication that the 
mechanism has achieved its desired position (i.e., "ready-to-latch," "latched"). 
• End of travel stops shall be provided for all safety critical movable mechanical 
systems. 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
7.0 Torque/Force Margins 
• The Inargin is the Inechanism's torque or force available to perform a function over 
and above the torque or force actually necessary to perform a function 
• Margin, as demonstrated conservatively by test or analytical calculations, shall take 
into account the following worst case environmental conditions including: 
- Frictional effects 
- Alignment effects 
- Latching forces 
- Thermally induced distortions 
- Load induced distortions 
- Variations in lubricity including degradation or depletion of lubrication under vacuum and 
under worst case thermal conditions 
• Operating Torque Margin = ( Available Driving TorquelResistive Torque) -1 
- For linear devices, "Force" replaces "Torque" in the above equation 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
7.0 TorquelForce Margins (continued) 
• 
• 
The holding torque or force margin is the margin provided to prevent inadvertent 
operation 
Margin, as conservatively demonstrated by test or analytical calculations, shall take 
into account worst case environmental conditions that work against the holding 
force/torque including: 
- Frictional effects 
- Alignment effects 
- Latching forces 
- Thermally induced distortions 
- Load induced distortions 
- Inertial Loading of Mechanical Components 
• Holding Torque Margin = (Available Holding Torque/Torque Applied by Limit 
load) -1 
- For linear devices, "Force" replaces "Torque" in the above equation 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
7.0 Torque/Force Margins (continued) 
• 
• 
• 
Both operating and holding torque/force margins shall be acceptance-test verified 
unless another verification approach is approved by the MSWG 
A margin of 1.0 or greater is required at every point of travel when test verified 
Test verification of the an10unt of driving or holding torque or force available under 
conservative adverse conditions 
- Does not require a mechanical system demonstration at greater than limit load conditions 
Verification by analysis only will require prior review and approval of the analytical 
approach and margin requirement by the MSWG 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
8.0 Contamination 
• Fabrication and handling of safety critical movable mechanical assemblies shall be 
accomplished in a clean envirollll1ent 
- Avoidance of non-particulate (chemical) as well as particulate air contamination 
- The particulate cleanliness of internal moving subassemblies shall be maintained to at 
least level 500 as defined in MIL-STD-1246 
• Specific cleanliness requirements shall be established for each movable mechanical 
assembly 
- Shall address cleanliness levels needed to prevent binding or jamming 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
9.0 Assembly Level Acceptance Tests 
• Each flight and qualification test article shall be subjected to acceptance testing 
- Run-in 
- Functional 
Environmental testing 
• The acceptance tests shall be structured to detect workmanship defects that could 
affect operational perfonnance 
• 9.1 Run-in Test: 
- Run-in test shall be performed on each movable mechanical assembly after initial 
functional testing before it is subjected to further acceptance testing 
Objective is to detect any material/workmanship defects and to wear-in parts to ensure 
consistent and stable operation 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
9.0 Assembly Level Acceptance Tests (continued) 
• 9.2 Functional and Environmental Acceptance Tests: 
- Each movable mechanical assembly shall be subjected to functional and environmental 
tests 
- Functional tests shall be structured to demonstrate that the movable mechanical asselnbly 
is capable of operating to satisfy all performance requirements 
Functional tests are required before and after exposure to environmental test conditions in 
order to establish whether damage or degradation in performance has occulTed 
Environmental acceptance tests shall be structured to demonstrate the ability to achieve 
performance requirements when exposed to the expected environmental extremes and to 
identify any workmanship defects 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
10.0 Qualification Test 
• A Qualification Test Program (QTP) shall be established for each safety critical 
movable m.echanical assembly 
o A QTP shall assure that the mechanism design performance and safety margin exists 
with respect to safety critical functions (must work and/or must not work) 
• Verification of all design requirelnents when exposed to any mechanical, electrical, 
environmental, or operational conditions 
• Mechanism shall be tested in the launch, on-orbit and landing configurations 
• Mechanism must be exposed to the appropriate corresponding environmental 
extremes 
• Mechanism must be in its appropriate corresponding passive or operating state 
• Inspection and functional tests are required before and after qualification tests 
• MIL-STD-1540D may be helpful in establishing an effective Qualification Test 
Program. 
• Development testing prior to QTP is highly recommended to reduce costly redesign 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
11 .0 Design Life Verification Test 
• Design life verification testing shall be conducted to verify design life requirements 
in applications where design life sensitivity could exist 
• Fatigue limits being exceeded due to highly loaded components 
- Potential for deterioration of lubrication 
- Excessive wear due to high contact stresses 
• Design life testing for mechanisms that pose a catastrophic hazard potential shall 
assure at least four times the total number of required cycles including: 
Total number of mission operational cycles 
- Total number of component and vehicle functional and environmental test cycles 
• Design life testing for mechanisms that pose a critical hazard potential shall assure at 
least two times the total number of cycles including: 
- Total number of mission operational cycles 
- Total number of component and vehicle functional and environmental test cycles 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
11.0 Design Life Verification Test (continued) 
• Inspection and functional tests are required before and after design life 
verification tests 
• For prograIlls using proto-flight approaches, the test parameters may be adjusted 
with MSWG approval to avoid excessive endurance or fatigue limit margin 
erOSIon 
• Refurbishment shall be accomplished after the design life verification tests and 
prior to re-acceptance testing. 
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Mechanical System Safety 
Interpretation Letter Overview 
Mechanical Systems Verification Plan 
• A comprehensive Mechanical Systems Verification Plan (MSVP) must be 
submitted for review and approval by the MSWG. 
- Must describe the design and verification approach for safety critical movable 
mechanical systems 
- If DFMR approach is to be used the MSVP must address each of the design and 
verification provisions outlined in the interpretation letter 
" The specific purpose of this plan is to establish an understanding on how 
applicable systems requirements will be implemented and vedfied. 
• Before a movable mechanical system can be classified as a DFMR Mechanical 
System, compliance to the subject letter requirements must be provided to and 
approved by the MSWG. 
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Mechanism holding torque or force margin shall be acceptance-test verified unless another 
verification approach is approved by the MSWG. When test verified, a margin of 1.0 or 
greater is required in the applicable mechanism holding configuration(s). The holding 
torque or force margin is the margin provided to prevent inadvertent operation. Verification 
by analysis only will require prior review and approval of the analytical approach and margin 
requirement by the MSWG. This margin, as conservatively demonstrated by test or 
analytical calculations, shall take into account worst case environmental conditions, frictional 
effects, alignment effects, latching forces, thermally induced distortions, and load induced 
distortions, etc. The holding torque margin is defined as: 
Holding Torque Margin = (Available Holding Torque / Torque Applied by Limit Load) - 1 
For linear devices, "Force" replaces "Torque" in the above equation . 
Verification by test, as specified in this paragraph , does not require a mechanical system 
demonstration at greater than limit load conditions but rather requires a test verification of 
the amount of driving or holding torque or force available under conservative adverse 
conditions. 
8.0 Contamination. Fabrication and handling of safety critical movable mechanical 
assemblies shall be accomplished in a clean environment with attention given to avoiding 
nonparticulate (chemical) as well as particulate air contamination. Specific cleanliness 
requfrements shall be established for each movable mechanical assembly and shall 
address cleanliness levels needed to prevent binding or jamming. 
9.0 Assembly Level Acceptance Tests. Each movable mechanical assembly designated 
for flight or as a qualification test article shall be subjected to acceptance testing which 
incorporates run-in, functional, and environmental testing. The acceptance tests shall be 
structured to detect workmanship defects that could affect operational performance. For 
programs using proto-flight approaches, the test parameters may be adjusted with MSWG 
approval to avoid excessive endurance or fatigue limit margin erosion . 
9.1 Run-in Test. After initial functional testing, a run-in test shall be performed on each 
movable mechanical assembly before it is subjected to further acceptance testing. The 
purpose of the run-in test is to detect material/workmanship defects and to wear-in parts. 
9.2 Functional and Environmental Acceptance Tests. Each movable mechanical 
assembly shall be subjected to functional and environmental tests. Functional tests shall be 
structured to demonstrate that the movable mechanical assembly is capable of operating to 
satisfy all performance requirements. Functional tests are required before and after 
exposure to environmental test conditions in order to establish whether damage or 
degradation in performance has occurred. Environmental acceptance tests shall be 
structured to demonstrate the ability to achieve performance requirements when exposed to 
the expected environmental extremes and to identify any workmanship defects. 
10.0 Qualification Test. A Qualification Test Program shall be established for each safety 
critical movable mechanical assembly. The qualification test program shall assure that a 
design performance and safety margin exists with respect to all design requirements when 
exposed to any mechanical , electrical , environmental , including acceptance testing, and 
• 
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operational stimuli that the product may reasonably expect to encounter during its service 
life. The mechanism shall be tested in its launch, on-orbit, and landing configurations with 
the appropriate corresponding environmental extremes and with the mechanism in its 
appropriate passive or operating state. Inspection and functional tests are required before 
and after qualification tests. MIL-STD-1540D may be helpful in establishing an effective 
Qualification Test Program. Natural and induced environmental conditions shall include but 
are not limited to, thermally induced in-plane and out-of-plane distortions, differential 
thermal growth and shrinkage, and load-induced deflections. For programs using proto-
flight approaches, the test parameters may be adjusted with MSWG approval to avoid 
excessive endurance or fatigue limit margin erosion . 
11 .0 Design Life Verification Tests. For applications where design life might be a concern 
due to endurance or fatigue limits being exceeded, potential deterioration of lubrication, or 
excessive wear, design life verification testing shall be conducted to verify that design life 
requ irements have been complied with. Design life testing for mechanisms that pose a 
catastrophic hazard potential shall assure at least four times the number of operational 
cycles, plus four times the number of component and vehicle functional and environmental 
test cycles. Design life testing for mechanisms that pose a critical hazard potential shall 
assure at least two times the number of operational cycles, plus two times the number of 
component and vehicle functional and environmental test cycles. Inspection and functional 
tests are required before and after design life verification tests. For programs using proto-
flight approaches, the test parameters may be adjusted with MSWG approval to avoid 
excessive endurance or fatigue limit margin erosion. Refurbishment shall be accomplished 
after the design life verification tests and prior to reacceptance testing. 
A comprehensive Mechanical Systems Verification Plan that describes the verification 
approach for safety critical movable mechanical systems must be submitted for review and 
approval by the MSWG. The specific purpose of this plan is to establish an understanding 
on how applicable systems requirements will be implemented and verified . Before a 
movable mechanical system can be classified as a DFMR Mechanical System, compliance 
to the subject letter requirements must be provided to and approved by the MSWG. 
Although cancelled, mechanical system designers may still refer to MIL-A-83577 as a 
guideline during the design and verification process. Questions concerning this letter 
should be directed to the Executive Secretary, Space Shuttle Payload Safety Review Panel, 
JSC/NC4, at (281) 483-8848. 
Original Signed By: Original Signed By: 
William H. Gerstenmaier Jay H. Greene 
Enclosure 
cc: 
See List 
I-
I 
.~ 
MA2-00-0S7 
Distribution: 
CB/G. D. Griffith 
D012/J. M. Childress 
EA44/R. J. Wren 
MA2/A. M. Larsen 
MA2ID. E. O'Brien 
MA2/D. W. Whittle 
MA2/J. G. Williams 
NC4/M. L. Ciancone 
NCSS/SAIC/E. J. Conner 
NE2/G. L. Priest 
OZ3ID. W. Hartman 
SD2/M. E. Coleman 
USAIUSH-700D/H. A. Maltby 
cc: 
AE/J. F. Whiteley 
CAiJ . D. Wetherbee 
CB/C. J. Precourt 
DAiB. R. Stone 
EAlL. S. Nicholson 
EA4/D. A. Hamilton 
KN/NASDAIT. Akutsu 
LM/ I. M. Dornell 
MAiR. D. Dittemore 
MG/ R. H. Heselmeyer 
MM/J. B. Costello 
MMIT. W. Logan 
MQ/M. D. Erminger 
MS/L. D. Austin , Jr. 
MS3/D. L. Ladrach 
MS3/K. B. Packard 
MT IR. M. Swalin 
MV/R. R. Roe, Jr. 
NC44/M. L. Mudd 
OAiT. W. Holloway 
OE/J. B. Holsomback 
OIIW. J. Bennett 
OR/CSA/H. L. Williams 
OT/ESAIU. J. Thomas 
XNG. J. Harbaugh 
HQ/M-4IW. M. Hawes 
HQ/MO/S. R. Nichols 
HQ/M-7/N. B. Starkey 
KSC/EC-G1/J. C. Dollberg 
KSC/MKlJ. D. Halsell, Jr. 
KSC/MK-SIO/R. L. Segert 
USAIUSH-700D/L. Lo 
- J.JJ~ -- -- ~J ~J
Canadian Space Agency 
Space Station Program 
Attn: P. M. Jean 
6 
Manager, Safety and Product 
Assurance 
6767 route de l'Aeroport 
Saint-Hebert, Quebec 
Canada J3Y 8Y9 
ESTEC-GPQ 
Attn: T. Sgobba 
T. Heimann 
P. O. Box 299 NL 
2200 AG , Noordwijk 
The Netherlands 
NASDA 
Tsukuba Space Center 
Attn : H. Hasegawa 
Space Station Safety and 
Product 
Assurance Office 
Reliability Assurance 
2-1-1 Sengen 
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki 
Japan 30S 
RSC Energia 
Attn: P. Vorobiev 
4a Lenin Street 
Korolev 
141070 Moscow Reg ion 
Russia 
